The law and finance literature characterizes debt covenants as a mechanism that helps to manage agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders. While both banks and bond holders make use of these covenants, they do so in quite different ways. Banks typically monitor their debtors closely and rely on financial maintenance covenants to protect their interests. When these covenants get triggered, banks can use the leverage of accelerating the loan to achieve their governance goals. This ability to monitor and renegotiate suggests that tailoring precise ex ante contract restrictions is not of paramount importance because a bank and a debtor can negotiate around those restrictions based on ex post contract conditions. Bond holders, in contrast, generally do not monitor and renegotiate with their debtors because these bond holders tend to be large groups of passive investors who face substantial collective action problems. As a consequence, ex ante restrictive terms in the contract are likely to be the primary means through which bondholders can address potential conflicts with shareholders. These differences in contracting technologies suggest that the restrictions in bond contracts are more likely to be responsive to changes in background legal rules. This paper tests this theory by treating two Delaware decisions that sharply limited the default duties that the directors of Delaware corporations owe to their creditors as a shock to Delaware debt contract terms. Difference-in-difference and triple difference tests suggest that restrictive terms in bond contracts reacted strongly to this change, while there was not a detectable shift in loan agreements.
bond holders have little power to deter shareholder payouts, risk taking, claim dilution, and other actions that can harm their interests.
The difference in these contracting technologies is likely to have consequences for the evolution of contract terms that restrict debtors from taking actions that harm creditor interests. For banks, fine tuning these ex ante restrictions is relatively inconsequential because of their ability to renegotiate contracts. Investments in the drafting and negotiation of ex ante restrictions are thus unlikely to provide much of a payoff. This calculus is different for bond indentures. If these agreements do not include express restrictions, bondholders will have little recourse if the bond issuer wants to take an action that favors equity at the expense of debt. This difference suggests that bond holders are likely to get a larger return from ex ante investments in these types of restrictions. It follows that bond contracts should react more strongly to changes in the background legal rules that affect their rights against debtors.
To test this hypothesis, this article treats two Delaware cases from 2006 as an exogenous shock to the ability of creditors to recover damages for decisions made by directors when corporations are, or are nearly, insolvent. These two cases-decided within weeks each other-both limited the ability of creditors to recover damages from directors for taking creditor-adverse actions. The first of these cases, Trenwick America Litigation Trust v.
Ernst Young, L.L.P.
2 , declined to recognize deepening insolvency as a cause of action. This claim would allow a creditor to assert that actions taken by the directors while a corporation was insolvent rendered the financial condition of the corporation even worse. Two federal courts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals-which includes Delaware-and the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Delaware had recently recognized deepening insolvency as a theory of liability. Some commentators believed the the Delaware Court of Chancery would follow suit (Zelmanovitz and Baribeau, 2006) . The Trenwick decision was therefore something of a surprise to legal practitioners.
The second decision, North American Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v.
Gheewalla 3 similarly limited the default rights of the creditors of Delaware corporations.
That decision foreclosed the possibility that creditors could assert a direct claim against directors for breach of fiduciary duty and also eliminated the possibility that creditors could bring any fiduciary duty claim while in the "zone of insolvency." After Gheewalla, the only viable fiduciary duty claim for creditors of a Delaware corporation was a derivative claim once the corporation had actually become insolvent. This decision reversed course from
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 4 which suggested that creditors could assert direct claims while in the zone of insolvency.
The limitations that Trenwick and Gheewalla placed on the ability of creditors to sue debtors who are in or approaching insolvency are likely to have affected how creditors governed their relationships with those debtors. Prior to these cases, creditors may have been able to deter actions that would benefit equity at their expense by threatening to sue for violation of a fiduciary duty or for deepening insolvency. After these cases, creditors would need to increase the overall restrictiveness of the covenants in their debt agreements to makeup for this lost deterrence. This deterrence benefit must, however, be traded off against the cost of tailoring these terms to prospective debtors and then negotiating those terms. For banks, that benefit is likely to be minimal because they can use their ability to monitor and renegotiate with debtors to keep them from taking actions that conflict their interests.
Given this small gain, there is little point in bearing the costs of developing a well-tailored package of ex ante restrictions. For bondholders, however, the diminished scope of ex post litigation rights may create real risks because they cannot use maintenance covenant-based governance to influence creditors. In that case, the cost of negotiating a restriction may be worth the gain in deterrence. This difference suggests that bond contracts for Delaware creditors are likely to be more restrictive than loan agreements everywhere as well as bond contracts for non-Delaware firms.
3 2006 WL 2588971 (Del. Ch., Sep. 1, 2006 Sep. 1, ), affirmed, 930 A.2d 92 (2007 . 4 1991 WL 277613 (Nov. 6, 1991 .
The evidence is broadly consistent with this expectation. There is no statistically detectable increase in the restrictiveness of loan contracts for Delaware and non-Delaware firms in the periods before and after these cases (referred to subsequently as pre and postGheewalla, for convenience). There is, however, evidence of increased restrictiveness in the bond contracts entered into by Delaware firms relative to non-Delaware firms during the post-Gheewalla period. As one would expect, the results are particularly strong for those debtors who are in poor financial health. This evidence suggests that the substantial differences in the way banks and bondholders govern their relationships with debtors is borne out in the content of their contracts.
This paper continues as follows. Part II reviews the legal landscape. This part also details the pre and post-Gheewalla understandings of creditors' default legal rights and documents the reactions of commentators to Trenwick and Gheewalla. Part III develops the theory of how different types of creditors are likely to react to the diminishment of their default legal rights and use this theory to generate hypotheses. Part IV begins with a description of the dataset, which is drawn from Dealscan, the Fixed Income Security Database (FISD), and Compustat. This section continues with a basic statistical overview of pre and post-Gheewalla contract terms. This part then employs difference-in-difference and triple difference designs to test whether Gheewalla had an effect on the content of debt contracts. The evidence broadly supports the hypothesis that bond contracts respond more directly to changes in the background legal environment. Part V discusses the results of some robustness checks and explores some other modeling concerns. Part VI concludes and Appendix A provides variable definitions.
Legal Background
The directors of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. In good times, these duties are synonymous with maximizing the value of the firm. Once a firm is insolvent, how-ever, those duties to maximize firm value run to creditors because there is no residual value left for shareholders (Baird and Henderson, 2008) . These principles are quite uncontroversial in corporate law. Courts have struggled, however, to determine whether directors should be held to a stricter legal standard when a firm is insolvent and have had difficulty articulating to whom directors owe fiduciary duties as a firm approaches insolvency. In Delaware, the state of incorporation for over half of the public companies in the United States, there were open questions about both these issues until 2006. This section reviews the case law before and after Delaware courts resolved both questions and then documents the corporate legal community's reaction to these changes.
Deepening Insolvency
The claim of deepening insolvency alleges that directors further encumbered the assets of the corporation rather than filing for bankruptcy at a point when it would have maximized 
Cumulative Impact of Trenwick and Gheewalla
Together, Trenwick and Gheewalla sent a distinct message to creditors: Delaware courts will do very little for you beyond enforcing your agreements. Practitioners noticed the import of both these cases almost immediately. claimed that it justified the dismissal of fiduciary claims against directors by creditors.
At the very least, these two opinions resolved ambiguities about the extent to which creditors could rely on default rules to police the behavior of debtors. On a more aggressive view, the cases represented a substantial limitation of creditor default rights. Whatever the precise characterization, the sophisticated current and future creditors of Delaware corporations likely had an increased awareness after Trenwick and Gheewalla that, in the absence of contractual protections, they had few legal options to protect their interests.
Theory and Hypothesis Development
The question of interest in this paper is how different types of creditors responded to the changes in the legal environment created by Trenwick and Gheewalla. Those changes are likely to have affected the governance of the relationships that creditors have with debtors.
The commonly assumed goal of these relationships is the maximization of contractual surplus and the minimization of the costs associated with the negotiation and administration of these agreements.
The costs of debt governance have both ex ante and ex post dimensions.
17 . Ex ante negotiating costs require identifying and reaching agreement on provisions that protect creditors from the agency cost-related dangers like asset substitution and claim dilution. These provisions include express restrictions on certain actions by the debtor firm, such as dividend payments and share repurchases, as well as requiring the use of proceeds from asset sales and equity issues to pay down existing debt. The ex post options include setting maintenance 
Pa.).
17 There is a substantial legal literature on balancing the ex ante and ex post aspects of contractual governance. Examples include Scott and Triantis (2006) , Choi and Triantis (2010) , Badawi (2011) , and Gilson et al. (2010) covenants and, should they be triggered, negotiating the consequences.
The costs of the ex ante and ex post options vary for different types of creditors. Broadly speaking, banks have the ability to monitor the financial condition of debtors and, should circumstances trigger a covenant violation, they have substantial leverage to control the behavior of those debtors. The option to use these ex post options should lead banks to weigh carefully the costs of ex ante contracting against the costs of ex post renegotiation as governance mechanisms (Gârleanu and Zwiebel, 2009 ). Bond holders, in contrast, have much less recourse to ex post governance. This light monitoring is largely due to the substantial collective action problems faced by bondholders and the lack of legal and monetary incentives for bond trustees to pursue violations of maintenance covenants (Kahan and Rock, 2009 ).
As a consequence, bond trustees will rarely, if ever, use the leverage that a covenant violation provides to insist on operational changes.
18 Their recourse to court is likely to be limited to clear violations of restrictive covenants or, in the absence of covenants, claims that directors have violated fiduciary duties, to the extent courts permit them. The limited monitoring and control rights of bond holders is likely to mean that restrictive contract provisions provide their only meaningful means of governance.
These different governance mechanisms suggest that banks and bond holders will not react in similar ways to legal change. Take the shift that occurred post-Gheewalla. Creditors lost some ability to rely on default fiduciary duties to deter or punish debtor actions that harmed their interests. The safety valve nature of fiduciary duties means that a significant limitation on the ability to assert those claims will require creditors to fill in those gaps in another way. That can mean using maintenance covenant as a mechanism of governance or through ex ante restrictive contract terms. The latter approach is likely to require expanded due diligence on potential debtors, additional negotiations, and additional drafting costs.
For banks, the increased costs associated with ex ante governance are likely to be com-pared with the alternative of using monitoring and renegotiation. Most banks are already paying the costs of using this ex post governance so the prospect of higher up front costs is probably unappealing. For bondholders, the calculus is likely to be different. The cost of ex post monitoring and renegotiating is extremely high for them. Using this approach to fill in the gaps left open by weakened fiduciary duties would pose substantial hurdles. This is likely to leave increased investment in ex ante governance as the most palatable option for bond holders to deter firm actions that harm their interests.
The increased investment in ex ante governance should lead to a stronger insistence on covenants that restrict debtors from taking actions that favor equity at the expense of debt.
These covenants are likely to include limitations on shareholder payouts, negative pledge covenants (which restrict debtors from issuing future debt more senior to current debt), and limitations on investment and asset sales. This reasoning predicts that in the post-Gheewalla period, all else equal, there should be an increase in the number of these types of covenants in bond indentures for Delaware debtors. In other states, however, there should be no such change because there was no shift in the fiduciary duties owed to creditors.
A related prediction concerns the effect of legal changes on bank loan terms. As discussed above, banks have the option to rely on maintenance covenants to control the agency costs of debt. There are, however, some limitations to that approach. Using maintenance covenants requires that those covenants actually get triggered, which typically requires a firm's finances to become worse than they were at the time of loan origination. To put this another way, the monitoring and renegotiation governance approach usually requires a bad state of the world. In good states of the world-meaning the status quo or better-banks will typically not have the leverage that a triggered maintenance covenant provides. There may still be agency cost concerns during these good times and, for that reason, banks may bargain for restrictive covenants to manage those situations.
The legal change created by Trenwick and Gheewalla, however, affected governance when bad states of the world occur. Recall that the case eliminated any liability to creditors when a firm entered the "zone of insolvency" and also eliminated direct liability of any kind. If loan maintenance covenants are set relatively tightly, a firm's movement into the zone of insolvency or into insolvency itself should trigger those covenants. The diminished ability to bring a lawsuit brought about Gheewalla should thus be relatively inconsequential to loan governance because banks can use the leverage provided by a the triggered covenant. This dynamic suggests that banks are unlikely to respond to Gheewalla by investing more in ex ante contract restrictions.
Results

Data
The data in this paper come from three primary sources: FISD, Dealscan, and The primary variables of interest are the restrictions that implicate creditor agency concerns. As discussed above, the chief dangers from the perspective of creditors are shareholder payouts, subordinating existing debt, and selling assets. The bond portion of the table lists the averages for some of these provisions including dividend restrictions (including both the issuer and/or subsidiary restrictions), and restrictions on issuing senior debt. Following other similar work, I construct an index based on some of the most frequently used covenants. 21 .
Sample Overview
Each of these six bond restrictions is coded one if it is present and zero if it is not. The index is the sum of these variables.
22
The simple trend for the individual bond restrictions and the bond covenant index is clear for at-risk borrowers. The difference in the means between non-Delaware issuers and 20 Z is a measure of firm's financial distress. For non-manufacturing firms a score lower than 1.1 indicates a significant risk of distress (Altman, 1968) .
21 Examples of other work that uses a similar include Billet et al. Billett et al. (2007) , Fields et al. Fields et al. (2012) , and Qi et al. Qi et al. (2011) 22 The restrictions included in the index are dividend restrictions (including issuer and/or subsidiaries), restrictions on shareholder payouts, cross-default provisions, restrictions on asset sales (issuer and/or subsidiaries), negative pledge covenants, and restrictions on subsidiary debt.
Delaware issuers is more pronounced after the Gheewalla decision. This trend is most apparent in the negative pledge restrictions. These provisions were more common for non-Delaware issuers prior to Gheewalla (about 74 percent against roughly 62 percent), but after Gheewalla, these provisions appeared more frequently for Delaware issuers (about 68 percent versus approximately 62 percent). Prior to Gheewalla the difference between the percentage of contracts with dividend restrictions was about six percent, but after the cases, Delaware issuers outpace non-Delaware issuers by about eleven percent. The gap the in the mean covenant index between Delaware and non-Delaware issuers was about .26 before Ghewalla, but the spread increases to about .65 in the later period..
23
23 The general trend in post-Gheewalla period up until the financial crisis was a reduction in overall covenant restrictiveness that has been credited the rise in covenant-lite debt. The concern of this article is, however, the relative difference in between Delaware and non-Delaware firms during the pre and postGheewalla periods. For a model of the rise of covenant-lite phenomenon see Ayotte and Bolton Ayotte and Bolton (2011) . To provide a more detailed sense of the relatively dramatic difference in bond covenant strictness for distressed Delaware and non-Delaware firms after Gheewalla, Figures 1 and 2 track the covenant index over the sample period. The figures depict the 18-month moving average of the covenant index for Delaware and non-Delaware firms in each of the 6 month periods in the sample. 24 Figure 1 shows those differences for non-distressed firms in the Delaware and non-Delaware groups. It demonstrates that the covenant index changed at roughly the same rate for Delaware and non-Delaware firms both before and after Gheewalla. The second half of the summary statistics table presents information for loans and borrowers. The table reinforces several well-known differences between the loan and bond markets.
Bond issuers tend to be larger and less leveraged than borrowers. The typical explanation for this observation is that there tends be less information asymmetry between larger firms and potential passive creditors (Colla et al., 2013) . A small firm about which little is known would have to pay high interest on any public bonds and hence they gravitate toward the loan market because the monitoring ability of banks reduces the amount of information asymmetry.
The covenant information in the Dealscan database does not map precisely to the equivalent information in FISD. While both report dividend restrictions there is no information on Dealscan on the presence of negative pledge covenants. 25 Dealscan does, however, code whether there are debt sweeps in loan documents. These provisions fulfill much the same 24 The weights are the number of debt agreements. 25 Both FISD and Dealscan code a dividend restriction as present when the agreement contains a term that limits a dividend to a specified percentage of a financial metric. For example, an agreement might specify that the debtor can issue no more than ten percent of quarterly earnings as a dividend. 
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When it comes to some provisions, such as dividend restrictions, the loan contracts are substantially more restrictive than the bonds. There are likely two reasons for this state of affairs. First, borrowers tend to have lower credit quality and higher information asymmetry than bond issuers (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999) . As a consequence, loan contracts may contain more restrictive initial terms. Second, the restrictions in loan agreements may not be as restrictive as they seem. The relational nature of lender-borrower contracts means that borrowers may be able to negotiate around a written dividend restriction. Doing so would be much more difficult in the bond context because negotiating with the bondholders to relax a contract term is prohibitively costly.
27
The shift in these variables in the pre and post-Gheewalla periods are substantially less pronounced than they are for bonds. Prior to Gheewalla there is about a seven percentage point difference in the number of at-risk Delaware and non-Delaware loans that have dividend restrictions and after Gheewalla that difference increases modestly to about eleven percentage points. Prior to Gheewalla, the percentage of debt sweeps for at-risk firms is about 31 percent for non-Delaware firms and 52 percent for Delaware firms. After the case, the non-Delaware number jumps to about 42 percent while the Delaware number only increases to 56 percent.
Likewise, relative gap in the covenant index between Delaware firms and non-Delaware firms narrows after Gheewalla. These summary statistics provide an initial indication that the increases in relative restrictiveness of Delaware debt agreements were more pronounced for bonds than for loans.
Bond and Loan Term Results
The analysis in this section uses a difference-in-difference approach to analyze use of restrictive covenants during the sample period. The unit of analysis is an individual debt agreement, which allows the use of controls for the characteristics of the agreement and the debtor. The dependent variable in the regressions is either an indicator variable for a specific restrictive covenant or is the covenant index. The primary variable of interest is the interaction term for the issuer being a Delaware incorporated firm and the issue date occurring after the Gheewalla period (Lechner et al., 2011) . Given the reduction in the ability to rely on default fiduciary duties and the barriers to ex post renegotiation, the expectation is that the coefficient on this interaction term will be positive for bond indentures-especially those issued by distressed debtors-but will be zero for loan agreements.
The general form estimated in the regressions is:
where i indexes debt issues, COV is the covenant restriction or index of interest, DEL is an indicator variable for whether the issuer is incorporated in Delaware, POST is an indicator variable for whether the debt issuance occurred after the Gheewalla decision, and X i is a vector of issue controls, firm controls, firm fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The coefficient on the DEL × P OST interaction term is the estimated treatment effect of a debt issuance to a Delaware-incorporated firm after the Gheewalla decision. The standard errors are clustered by state of incorporation. All regressions use firm fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity between firms. Doing so should limit the potential influence of omitted variables. The use of firm fixed effects presumably accounts for the generally tight fit of the models. Table 2 presents the results of the covenant index, negative pledge covenant, and dividend restriction regressions for the entire sample of bonds. The variable of interest is the interaction term that indicates that the bond was issued to a Delaware-incorporated firm after the Gheewalla trial court case. The controls include the log of the bond amount, time to maturity, the log of total firm assets in the quarter of bond issuance, and firm leverage in that quarter.
The coefficients for the interaction term are all positive and and the negative pledge and dividend restriction coefficients are statistically significant at the five-percent and tenpercent levels, respectively. This provides some preliminary evidence that Trenwick and Gheewalla led to tightened restrictions on bonds issued to Delaware firms. Given, however, that Trenwick and Gheewalla altered creditor rights when firms are in or near insolvency, one would expect its impact to be strongest when firms are less financially stable. To assess the magnitude of these cases' effect on the least financially stable firms, Table 3 performs   the same regressions as Table 2 , but for bonds issued to firms with Altman-Z scores below 1.1.
As expected, the effect of Trenwick and Gheewalla on the prevalence of restrictive covenants is stronger for these at-risk firms. The coefficients for the interaction term are substantially larger in the regressions for at-risk firms than they are is for the entire sample. The coefficients are also all statistically significant at either the one or five percent levels. These results provide substantial evidence that bond lawyers noticed the effect of Trenwick and Gheewalla on Delaware issuers. They appear to have responded by increasing the strength of protections on those bonds, especially when there was a substantial chance that a firm would approach insolvency over the course of the issue. Table 4 turns to an analysis of covenants in loan agreements. The hypothesis developed in the previous section predicts that loan restrictiveness is less likely to respond to Trenwick This table presents coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The column titles provide list the dependent variables for each of the regressions. The Delaware and Post-Gheewalla coefficients are not reported. Standard errors are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
and Gheewalla, if there is any response at all. As explained above, the Dealscan coding of restrictions does not map exactly to those in FISD. The dependent variables used in the loan regressions include the Dealscan covenant index, the presence of a debt sweep covenant, and the presence of a dividend restriction. The controls used in the loan regressions are largely similar to those used in the bond regressions. The only difference is the addition of a variable to control for whether the loan is syndicated.
28
As predicted, the cases appear to have had little influence on loan contract restrictiveness.
The coefficients of interest are not statistically significant in any of the specifications in Table   4 . This table, however, includes all of the loans in the sample. As discussed previously, if the cases are to have an effect on debt contracts, it is most likely to affect those firms that are close to distress. Post-Gheewalla, creditors of those firms have substantially less recourse 28 The results are unchanged if the syndication variable is omitted. This table presents coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The column titles provide list the dependent variables for each of the regressions. The Delaware and Post-Gheewalla coefficients are not reported. Standard errors are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
to default debtor duties than they did beforehand. Table 5 performs the same regressions as Table 4 , but limits the sample to loans to firms that have Altman-Z scores below 1.1.
The covenant index and dividend restriction coefficients are not statistically significant in Table 5 . 29 While the debt sweep coefficient is statistically significant at the ten-percent level, it is negative. This evidence provides additional support for the hypothesis that the availability of ex post monitoring and negotiation in the bank lending environment means that loan contract terms are far less responsive to background legal rules. This account is consistent with banks not investing much in the upfront drafting of terms and instead devoting their governance resources to what happens after the agreement has been signed.
If financial distress is the concern, the most effective way to deal with that worry appears to be setting tight covenants and negotiating a resolution that protects the interest of the lender.
Triple Difference Regressions
The previous regressions provide evidence that, within bond contracts, there was a tightening in contract restrictiveness during the post-Gheewalla period for Delaware firms. Within bank loan contracts, there is not evidence of this shift. This showing, however, does not demonstrate that there is a statistically detectable difference between the two groups of contracts. To ascertain whether there is such a difference, this section reports the results of triple difference regressions. The interaction term of interest indicates whether the contract is for a Delaware incorporate firm and was entered into after the Gheewalla decision and was for a bond issuance. The the triple difference regressions are of the form:
One concern with combining the two datasets is the comparability of the contract variables. To address this problem, I limit the analysis to the most analogous terms in the contracts. These variables include the amount of the borrowed funds, the time to maturity, whether the loan is secured, the presence of a debt restriction, and the presence of a dividend restriction. The covenant index in this part of the analysis is the sum of the debt restriction and dividend restriction variables. Table 6 presents the results of this analysis.
The coefficient of interest, the triple difference indicator, is large, positive, and statistically significant in all specifications. This provides particularly strong evidence that there is something different about the bond agreements entered into by Delaware incorporated firms during the post-Gheewalla period. As expected, the differences are larger for the at-risk firms than they are for the entire sample of firms each of the dependent variables. This evidence suggests that the limitation on creditor duties caused a particularly strong reaction among Delaware bond creditors who were most likely to have to resort to the default rules that applied to creditors.
Modeling Concerns
This section discusses two related modeling concerns. The first is that the model may be sensitive to different specifications. The first subsection runs some robustness checks to assess these worries. The second is the specific worry that other states may follow Delaware corporate rules. If so, there is unlikely to be variation between the states after the Trenwick and Gheewalla decisions. The second subsection shows that other states have generally declined to follow these decisions.
Robustness Checks
The chief result of interest-the relative increase in bond covenant strictness for distressed firms in Delaware after Gheewalla-is robust to changes in time frame and the threshold for financial distress. The choice of time frame in difference-in-difference studies poses a tradeoff between statistical power and the ability to attribute observed effects to the exogenous shock.
The concern is that, as time goes on, it is less likely that differences between states depends on an earlier policy change. In addition, there is a worry that stretching the window too far back will inappropriately change the baseline for the post-shock comparison of the treated an untreated groups. With these caveats, I run a robustness check that expands the time frame an additional year before and an additional year after the sample period used above.
This unreported check, which includes bonds issued from 2003 to 2010, shows similar results to those reported above. The interaction coefficient for the covenant index is slightly lower, but remains significant at the five-percent level. The negative pledge regression produces a slightly higher interaction coefficient and it is significant at the one-percent level. The dividend restriction variable has an interaction coefficient that is about 25% lower, but remains significant at the one-percent level.
These results are also relatively robust to adjustments in the threshold for financial distress. In unreported regressions that increase the Z-Score cutoff to 1.5 instead 1.1, the value of all the coefficients drop, as one would expect. But the coefficient of interest remains statistically significant for the negative pledge and dividend restriction variables at the tenpercent and five-percent levels, respectively. At a threshold of 1.8, the results are similar with a coefficient that is significant at the ten-percent level for the negative pledge covenant and at the five-percent level for the dividend restriction. The results are essentially equivalent at a threshold of 2.1. (Broughman et al., 2014; Cain and Davidoff Solomon, 2012) 31 Casey v. Brennan, 780 A.2d 553, 567 (2001 substantially stronger obligation on directors to take creditor interests into account relative to the low thresholds set by Trenwick and Gheewalla. To be sure, a court could square the language of the statute with the view that it should just enforce agreements between firms and creditors. After all, doing so would take into account the interests of creditors. And if the statute were were merely permissive-meaning that it allowed directors to take into account non-shareholder interests, but did not require doing so-it would be even easier to adopt positions that are consistent with Trenwick and Gheewalla. Nevertheless, the broad use of these statutes suggests some reason to believe that non-Delaware courts were not likely to follow the Chancery Court in immediate lockstep.
The Influence of Delaware Law
33 Dooley v. O'Brien, 244 P.3d 586, 591 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) ("fiduciary obligations can apply even to creditors when a corporation enters the zone of insolvency, without regard to the terms in the underlying contracts"); Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas Inc., 178 Vt. 104, 117 (Vt. 2005 The Trenwick and Gheewalla decisions placed strong limitations on the ability of the creditors of distressed firms to assert fiduciary duty claims. Because these decisions affected only those firms incorporated in Delaware, it creates a quasi-natural experiment that should be able to detect the response of creditors to a limitation of their default rights. This article predicts that the different cost of the governance mechanisms available to loan and bond creditors should lead them to react in different ways. Loan creditors have the ability to perform ex post monitoring after the parties have signed an agreement. They can set tight maintenance covenants and then use the leverage provided when financial distress triggers those covenants. Given that loan creditors are already engaging in this type of ex post governance, they are unlikely to want to bear the costs of investing in the development of an optimal suite of ex ante restrictions. Bond creditors generally do not have the option of ex post governance through maintenance covenants. One would thus expect them to react to Gheewalla by investing more in ex ante contract restrictions that will protect their interests.
The evidence developed through the quasi-natural experiment broadly supports this theory. Bonds issued to Delaware corporations after Gheewalla show more ex ante restrictions than those issued to firms incorporated outside of Delaware. This effect is substantially stronger for less financially stable firms, who are more likely to be affected by the legal rules articulated in Trenwick and Gheewalla. The restrictive terms of bank loan agreements, however, do not appear to have responded to these cases. This evidence suggests the governance abilities of different creditors have a substantial effect on how they structure and manage their agreements with debtors. 
Post-Gheewalla
Indicator variable for whether debt was issued after the trial court's Gheewalla decision.
Log Bond Amount
The natural logarithm of the amount of bond principal.
Dividend Restriction
Indicator variable for whether the debt restricts the ability of the issuer and/or its subsidiaries to pay dividends.
Negative Pledge
Indicator variable for whether the bond restricts the ability of the borrower to issue additional debt.
Assets
The total assets of the corporation during the quarter of debt origination.
Sales
The total sales of the company in the quarter of debt origination.
Shareholder Equity
The amount of shareholder equity during the quarter of debt origination.
Leverage (Long Term Debt+Current Debt)/Total Assets during the quarter of debt origination.
Secured
Indicator variable for whether the debt was secured.
Syndicated
Indicator variable for whether a loan was syndicated. 
Altman-Z
